interests and convictions of our own people should the prolongation of
the strife so demand.

Of the untried measures there remain only: Recognition of the insurgents
as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral
intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between
the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party.
I speak not of forcible annexation, for that can not be thought of.
That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression.

Recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents has often
been canvassed as a possible, if not inevitable, step both in regard
to the previous ten years struggle and during the present war. I am
not unmindful that the two Houses of Congress in the spring of 1896
expressed the opinion by concurrent resolution that a condition of
public war existed requiring or justifying the recognition of a state
of belligerency in Cuba, and during the extra session the Senate voted
a joint resolution of like import, which, however, was not brought
to a vote in the House of Representatives. In the presence of these
significant expressions of the sentiment of the legislative branch it
behooves the Executive to soberly consider the conditions under which
so important a measure must needs rest for justification. It is to be
seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond
dispute the attributes of statehood, which alone can demand the
recognition of belligerency in its favor. Possession, in short, of
the essential qualifications of sovereignty by the insurgents and the
conduct of the war by them according to the received code of war are
no less important factors toward the determination of the problem of
belligerency than are the influences and consequences of the struggle
upon the internal polity of the recognizing state.