belligerency must be judged in every case in view of the particular
attending facts. Unless justified by necessity, it is always, and
justly, regarded as an unfriendly act and a gratuitous demonstration
of moral support to the rebellion. It is necessary, and it is
required, when the interests and rights of another government or of
its people are so far affected by a pending civil conflict as to
require a definition of its relations to the parties thereto. But
this conflict must be one which will be recognized in the sense of
international law as war. Belligerence, too, is a fact. The mere
existence of contending armed bodies and their occasional conflicts do
not constitute war in the sense referred to. Applying to the existing
condition of affairs in Cuba the tests recognized by publicists and
writers on international law, and which have been observed by nations
of dignity, honesty, and power when free from sensitive or selfish and
unworthy motives, I fail to find in the insurrection the existence of
such a substantial political organization, real, palpable, and
manifest to the world, having the forms and capable of the ordinary
functions of government toward its own people and to other states,
with courts for the administration of justice, with a local
habitation, possessing such organization of force, such material, such
occupation of territory, as to take the contest out of the category of
a mere rebellious insurrection or occasional skirmishes and place it
on the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency
would aim to elevate it. The contest, moreover, is solely on land; the
insurrection has not possessed itself of a single seaport whence it
may send forth its flag, nor has it any means of communication with
foreign powers except through the military lines of its adversaries.
No apprehension of any of those sudden and difficult complications
which a war upon the ocean is apt to precipitate upon the vessels,
both commercial and national, and upon the consular officers of other