the instant revocation of the order of reconcentration was asked,
so that the sufferers, returning to their homes and aided by united
American and Spanish effort, might be put in a way to support
themselves and, by orderly resumption of the well-nigh destroyed
productive energies of the island, contribute to the restoration of
its tranquillity and well-being. Negotiations continued for some little
time at Madrid, resulting in offers by the Spanish Government which
could not but be regarded as inadequate. It was proposed to confide the
preparation of peace to the insular parliament, yet to be convened under
the autonomous decrees of November, 1897, but without impairment in any
wise of the constitutional powers of the Madrid Government, which to
that end would grant an armistice, if solicited by the insurgents, for
such time as the general in chief might see fit to fix. How and with
what scope of discretionary powers the insular parliament was expected
to set about the "preparation" of peace did not appear. If it were to be
by negotiation with the insurgents, the issue seemed to rest on the one
side with a body chosen by a fraction of the electors in the districts
under Spanish control, and on the other with the insurgent population
holding the interior country, unrepresented in the so-called parliament
and defiant at the suggestion of suing for peace.

Grieved and disappointed at this barren outcome of my sincere endeavors
to reach a practicable solution, I felt it my duty to remit the whole
question to the Congress. In the message of April 11, 1898,[13] I
announced that with this last overture in the direction of immediate
peace in Cuba and its disappointing reception by Spain the effort of
the Executive was brought to an end. I again reviewed the alternative
courses of action which had been proposed, concluding that the only one
consonant with international policy and compatible with our firm-set
historical traditions was intervention as a neutral to stop the war and