later days, they have not been allowed to treat old treaties as scraps
of paper, since that is the prerogative of the Great Powers--a
prerogative which every single one of them exercises.

The best example of this state of affairs is the Customs tariff.[27] At
the end of our first war with China, in 1842, we concluded a treaty
which provided for a duty at treaty ports of 5 per cent. on all imports
and not more than 5 per cent on exports. This treaty is the basis of the
whole Customs system. At the end of our next war, in 1858, we drew up a
schedule of conventional prices on which the 5 per cent. was to be
calculated. This was to be revised every ten years, but has in fact only
been revised twice, once in 1902 and once in 1918.[28] Revision of the
schedule is merely a change in the conventional prices, not a change in
the tariff, which remains fixed at 5 per cent. Change in the tariff is
practically impossible, since China has concluded commercial treaties
involving a most-favoured-nation clause, and the same tariff, with
twelve States besides Great Britain, and therefore any change in the
tariff requires the unanimous consent of thirteen Powers.

When foreign Powers speak of the Open Door as a panacea for China, it
must be remembered that the Open Door does nothing to give the Chinese
the usual autonomy as regards Customs that is enjoyed by other sovereign
States.[29] The treaty of 1842 on which the system rests, has no
time-limit of provision for denunciation by either party, such as other
commercial treaties contain. A low tariff suits the Powers that wish to
find a market for their goods in China, and they have therefore no
motive for consenting to any alteration. In the past, when we practised
free trade, we could defend ourselves by saying that the policy we
forced upon China was the same as that which we adopted ourselves. But
no other nation could make this excuse, nor can we now that we have