A well-known banker, writing to the author of this work, makes some
points on the subject which are rather disturbing. His fundamental
proposition is that the judgment of experts is of no value when based
as it ordinarily is, only upon an inspection of an alleged fraudulent
signature, either with the naked eye or with the eye aided by
magnifying glasses, and upon a comparison of its appearance with that
of a writing or signature, admitted or known to the expert, to be
genuine, of the same party.

He alleges, in fact, that writing and signatures can be so perfectly
imitated that ocular inspection cannot determine which is true and
which is false, and that the persons whose signatures are in
controversy are quite as unable as anybody to decide that question.
Nevertheless, the law permits experts to give their opinions to
juries, who often have nothing except those opinions to control their
decisions, and who naturally give them in favor of the side which is
supported by the greatest number of experts, or by experts of the
highest repute.

Decisions upon such testimony this banker regards as no better than,
if quite as good as, the result of drawing lots. Of course he cannot
mean to include under these observations, that class of forgeries
which are so bunglingly executed as to be readily detected by the eye,
even of persons not specially expert. He can only mean to say that
imitations are possible and even common, which are so exact that their
counterfeit character is not determinable by inspection, even when
aided by glasses.

At first blush this contention of the banker is extremely a most
unsatisfactory view of the case, and the more correct it looks likely