expence; he may stand in need of dependents, and may be able no
otherwise to procure them, than by conniving at the fraud or the
violence which they commit: he may receive, in bribes, an equivalent for
his share, as an individual, in the public prosperity; for his interest
is not essentially connected with that of the state; he has a separate
interest; but the interest of the state, and of the king, are one: he
may even be corrupted to betray the councils, and give up the interests
of the nation, to a foreign power; but this is impossible to the king;
for nothing equivalent to what he would give up, could be offered him.
But as a king has not equal temptations to do wrong, neither is he
equally exposed to opposition, when he does right: the measures of a
substitute are frequently opposed, merely from interest; because the
leader of a faction against him, hopes, that if he can remove him by
popular clamour, he shall succeed to his power; but it can be no man's
interest to oppose the measures of a king, if his measures are good,
because no man can hope to supplant him. Are not these the precepts of
the Prophet, whose wisdom was from above?'--"Let not the eye of
expectation be raised to another, for that which thyself only should
bestow: suffer not thy own shadow to obscure thee; nor be content to
derive that glory, which it is thy prerogative to impart."

'But is the prince,' said ALMORAN, always the wisest man in his
dominions? Can we not find, in another, abilities and experience, which
we do not possess? and is it not the duty of him who presides in the
ship, to, place the helm in that hand which can best steer it?'

'A prince,' said HAMET, 'who sincerely intends the good of his people,
can scarce fail to effect it; all the wisdom of the nation will be at
once turned to that object: whatever is his principal aim, will be that
of all who are admitted to his council; for to concur with his