despotism was pure and simple; for Italians to even think of politics
was an act of high treason.

It is not generally known that a British army ultimately sent to Spain
was intended for Italy,[1] but its destination was changed because the
Italians showed so little disposition to rise against Napoleon. The
English Government was continually advised by its agents in Italy to
make Sicily, which was wholly in its power, the _point d'appùi_ for a
really great intervention in the destinies of the peninsula. 'The
grand end of all the operations in the Mediterranean,' wrote one of
Lord Castlereagh's correspondents, 'is the emancipation of Italy, and
its union in one great state.' Lord William Bentinck urged that if
Sicily were reunited to Naples under the Bourbons, liberty,
established there by his own incredible efforts, would be crushed, and
the King would wreck vengeance on the Constitution and its supporters.
Universal terror, he said, was felt at 'the unforgiving temper of
their Majesties.' He strongly supported a course proposed for her own
reasons by Queen Caroline: the purchase of Sicily by the English
Government which could make it 'not only the model but the instrument
of Italian independence.'

This way of talking was not confined to private despatches, and it was
no wonder if the Italians were disappointed when they found that
England declined to plead their cause with the Allies in Paris, and
afterwards at Vienna. When charged directly with breach of faith
before the House of Commons, Lord Castlereagh said that Austria, being
'in truth the great hinge on which the fate of mankind must ultimately
depend,' had to be paid (this was exactly the sense, though not the
form, of his defence) by letting her do what she liked with Italy.
There is a certain brutal straightforwardness in the line of argument.