came, he saw, and he had no need of conquering, for the soldiers of
that bad thing that had been Bourbon despotism in the Italian south
vanished before his path more quickly than the mists of the morning
before the sun. No grounds that will bear scrutiny have ever been
adduced for the reactionary explanation of the marvel: to wit, that
the Neapolitan generals were bribed. By Cavour? The game would have
been too risky. By 'English bank-notes,' that useful factor in
European politics that has every pleasing quality except reality? It
is not apparent how the corruptibility of the generals gives a better
complexion to the matter, but the writers on the subject who are
favourable to Francis II. seem to think that it does. Panic-stricken
these helpless Neapolitan officers may deserve to be called, but they
were not bought. And they had cause for panic with troops of whose
untrustworthiness they held the clearest proofs, and with the country
up in arms against them; for a few days after the taking of Reggio
this was the case, and this was by far the greatest miracle operated
by Garibaldi. The populations shook off their apathy, and not in
Calabria only but in the Puglie, the Basilicata, the Abruzzi, there
was a sudden awakening as from a too long sleep. When Garibaldi got to
Monteleone he found that Ghio had evacuated the town. He pursued him
to Soveria, where, on the 30th of August, the 12,000 men laid down
their arms. A few days later, another officer, General Caldarelli,
capitulated with 4000 men. Garibaldi's onward march was a perpetual
_fête_; everywhere he was received with frantic demonstrations of
delight. Still there was one point between himself and the capital
which might reasonably cause him some anxiety. There were 30,000 men
massed near Salerno, in positions of immense natural strength, where
they ought to have been able to stop the advance of an army twice the
size of Garibaldi's. How this obstacle was removed is far more
suggestive of a scene in a comic opera than of a page in history.