[Footnote 1: _Marbury v. Madison_, 1 Cranch, 176.]

It would seem at first blush that the power in the Court to declare
legislative acts unconstitutional affords a complete safeguard against
congressional encroachment on the prerogatives of the states. Such is
not the fact, however. The veto power of the Court by no means covers
the entire field of legislative activity. In the Convention which
framed the Constitution, attempts were made to give to the judiciary, in
conjunction with the executive, complete power of revision over
legislative acts, but all such propositions were voted down.[1] As
matters stand, there may be violations of the Constitution by Congress
(or for that matter by the executive) of which the Court can take no
cognizance.

[Footnote 1: See e.g., Farrand: "Records of the Federal Convention,"
Vol. I, pp. 138 et seq.; Vol. II, p. 298.]

For one thing, the Court cannot deal with questions of a political
character. The function of the Court is judicial only. Upon this ground
it was decided that the question which of two rival governments in the
State of Rhode Island was the legitimate one was for the determination
of the political department of government rather than the courts;[1]
that the question, whether the adoption by a state of the initiative and
referendum violated the provision of the Federal Constitution
guaranteeing to every state a republican form of government, was
political and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.[2] In 1867
a sovereign state sought to enjoin the President of the United States
from enforcing an act of Congress alleged to be unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court, without determining the constitutionality of the act,