framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural and
reasonable effect.

[Footnote 1: _Collins v. New Hampshire_, 171 U.S., 30.]

As already indicated, however, the nature and effect of a statute must
ordinarily be determined from the form and contents of the act itself,
rather than from outside sources, and the measure under consideration
purports to be a revenue act.

In the light of the decisions and principles of interpretation to which
reference has been made, the case against the constitutionality of the
act may seem well-nigh hopeless. The fact remains, however, that
Congress has not met the fundamental objection raised by the Supreme
Court. The Court declared the former act unconstitutional, not only
because it transcended the power of Congress under the particular
provision of the Constitution then invoked, viz., the Commerce Clause,
but also on the broad ground of state rights, because it "exerts a power
as to a purely local matter to which the federal authority does not
extend." It is difficult to see how this objection is obviated by
reënacting the act as a revenue measure. Under the circumstances perhaps
the apprehensive foes of federal encroachment should withhold their
lamentations until the Supreme Court has spoken again.[1]

[Footnote 1: Since this chapter was put into print the Court has spoken.
In _Bailey v. The Drexel Furniture Co._ (decided May 15, 1922) the Child
Labor Tax Law was pronounced unconstitutional. The Court, while
conceding that it must interpret the intent and meaning of Congress from
the language of the act, held that the act on its face is an attempt to
regulate matters of state concern by the use of a so-called tax as a