The inquiry is said to be important. But why is it so! All truth is
important. It is a question of little importance, merely whether a man
had a maker or no, although it is of great importance to disprove the
existence of such a Deity as theologians wish to establish, because
appearances in the world go against it. Supposing however that it was
granted, that the question, whether there is a Deity or not, was as
little important as other truths, yet the question becomes important
with this reflexion, that other events may follow as deductions; such
as a particular providence, or a future state of rewards and
punishments; but whether such deductions or either of them necessarily
follow may well be queried. As to a particular providence you give up
the reality of it, and I give it up too. But I cannot give up the
argument, that if there were a God with all his allowed attributes of
wisdom, power and justice, there ought to be a particular providence to
counteract the general laws of nature, in favour of those who defend
the interposition. Though the Deity should not interfere unless there
be a worthy cause, agreeable to the Horation rule,

_"Nec Deus interfuit nisi vindice nodus;"_

Yet surely from the same principles it should follow that the Deity
ought to interfere where there is a worthy cause. Here however arises
another dilemma, for if the Deity has really those attributes of power
and justice, there would never have been occasion for such temperaneous
interpositions. A particular providence must indeed prove one of these
two principles, either that God was imperfect in his design, or that
inert matter is inimical to the properties of God. If that wished for
interposition of the Deity is put off to a future existence, I cannot
help observing, that future day has been already a long while waited
for in vain, and any delay destroys some one attribute or other of the