benevolence, in that sense let him take it as agreed upon. He allows
that misery in the human species proves malevolence in the Deity, and
happiness the contrary. All the proof adduced in favour of benevolence
is in asserting that throughout the universe, good is more predominant
than evil. The infinite extent of benevolence he will allow incapable
of proof; but then it is said that the evils which mankind endure are
not so great as might be inflicted upon them; that virtue to vice,
happiness to misery, health to sickness bear at least equal proportions.
That lesser evils exist instead of greater is indeed but a poor proof
in the favour of the benevolence of an all-powerful Being. Or grant,
that good is more predominant than evil, this surely is no proof
neither of the benevolence of a kind and all-powerful Being. Yet
Dr. Priestley adds that the general benevolence of the Deity is
unquestionable. How unquestionable? It is questioned by the author
himself, and he declares he cannot prove it. After this he asks, who
will pretend to dictate to such a Being? He might in the same stile
conclude that no objection deserved a reply. The whole of this is
absurd; but when the Doctor begins to feel enthusiasm he is like the
rest of the ecclesiastical arguers. They reason themselves into
imaginary Beings with more imaginary properties and then fall down and
worship them. God is said to have made man in the image of himself. If
he has done so, man is up with him, for he in return makes God in his
own image. Much as the imagination of one man differs from another, so
differs the God of each devotee. They are all idolaters or
anthropomorphites to a man; there is none but an atheist that is not
the one or the other.

The admission of evil into the world is an argument so exceedingly
conclusive against at least a good Deity, that it is curious to see how
Dr. Priestley studies to get rid of that difficulty. He partly denies