at the same time, that happiness is the necessary consequence of
health, and that happiness is more from intellectual than corporeal
feelings. Surely health, if any thing, is corporeal. Another curious
fancy about pain and happiness is, that our finite nature not admitting
infinite or unlimited happiness we must leave it to the wisdom of the
Deity to determine which is best for us (since happiness must be
diminished) a little pain to be added to it or somewhat of happiness to
be taken away. It hardly requires the skill of a benevolent Deity to
determine which is best for the creatures he has made (and whom he
wishes to be as happy as their finite nature will admit) to lessen
their degree of happiness or mix therein a proportion of misery. To
conclude he asks, "how it is possible to teach children caution, but by
feeling pain?" It is easy to allow in answer, that it might not perhaps
be possible in us. But he is arguing about the benevolence of a Deity.
It was possible, he will allow, in him to have given these children
knowledge without pain, at least if he continues to him the attribute
he allows of omnipotence.

Next he observes that parents suspend at times their benefits to their
offspring, when persuaded they are not for their good; so does the
Deity. But before this argument holds he must therefore say, it is not
for the good of man to be made happy now, and that the Deity can be
infinitely benevolent without willing either infinite or universal
happiness. Take the argument any way, it must go against his
benevolence or his power; and the same observations hold as to his love
of justice, whilst he is so tardy in punishing offenders.

After observing that things are in an improving state, Dr. Priestley
allows, that the moral government of the universe is not perfect. From
thence he proceeds to assert, that atheists may believe it within the