Nikias, however, purposely delayed the attack until a force was sent
from Syracuse to defend the temple. He thought that if the soldiers
did succeed in plundering it, the state would be none the better for
it, and he himself would have to bear all the blame of sacrilege.

Nikias made no use of his boasted victory, and after a short time drew
off his forces to Naxos, where he passed the winter, expending an
enormous sum of money for the maintenance of so large a force, and
effecting little or nothing except the reduction of a few disorderly
tribes in the interior. The Syracusans now took heart again, marched
into the Katanean territory and laid it waste, and attempted to burn
the camp of the Athenians. Upon this all men blamed Nikias for
deliberating and taking precautions until the time for action was gone
by. No one could find any fault with him when he was actually
fighting; but though a bold and energetic man in action, he was slow
to form plans and begin an enterprise.

XVII. Thus when he did at length return to Syracuse, he managed the
operation so swiftly and so skilfully that he disembarked his troops
at Thapsus before the enemy were aware of his approach, took Epipolæ
by surprise, took prisoners three hundred of the force of picked men
who endeavoured to recapture that fort, and routed the Syracusan
cavalry, which had hitherto been supposed to be invincible. Moreover,
what chiefly terrified the Sicilians, and seemed wonderful to all
Greeks, was the speed with which he built a wall round Syracuse, a
city quite as large as Athens itself, but one which is much more
difficult to invest completely, because of the sea being so near to
it, and the rough ground and marshes by which it is surrounded on the
land side. Yet he all but succeeded in accomplishing this feat,
although he was not in a condition of body to superintend such works