proper course for the government to pursue in the face of these
difficulties. Some of the friends with whom I act have not hesitated
to express themselves in favor of coercion; and they have drawn very
gloomy pictures of the fatal consequences to the prosperity and
security of the whole Union that must ensue. For my own sake, I am
glad that I do not partake so largely in these fears. I see no
obstacle to the regular continuance of the government in not less
than twenty States, and perhaps more, the inhabitants of which have
not in a moment been deprived of that peculiar practical wisdom in
the management of their affairs which is the secret of their past
success. Several new States will, before long, be ready to take
their places with us and make good, in part, the loss of the old
ones. The mission of furnishing a great example of free government
to the nations of the earth will still be in our hands, impaired, I
admit, but not destroyed; and I doubt not our power to accomplish it
yet in spite of the temporary drawback. Even the problem of coercion
will go on to solve itself without our aid. For if the sentiment of
disunion become so far universal and permanent in the dissatisfied
States as to show no prospect of good from resistance, and there be
no acts of aggression attempted on their part, I will not say that I
may not favor the idea of some arrangement of a peaceful character,
though I do not now see the authority under which it can be originated.
The new Confederacy can scarcely be other than a secondary Power. It
can never be a maritime State. It will begin with the necessity of
keeping eight millions of its population to watch four millions, and
with the duty of guarding, against the egress of the latter, several
thousand miles of an exposed border, beyond which there will be no
right of reclamation. Of the ultimate result of a similar experiment,
I cannot, in my own mind, have a moment's doubt. At the last session
I ventured to place on record, in this House, a prediction by which