Possibly, this is a mere omission; but who can be quite sure, if McLean
or Curtis had sought to get into the opinion a declaration of unlimited
power in the people of a State to exclude slavery from their limits,
just as Chase and Mace sought to get such declaration, in behalf of the
people of a Territory, into the Nebraska bill--I ask, who can be quite
sure that it would not have been voted down in the one case as it had
been in the other? The nearest approach to the point of declaring the
power of a State over slavery is made by Judge Nelson. He approaches
it more than once, using the precise idea, and almost the language too,
of the Nebraska act. On one occasion his exact language is: "except in
cases where the power is restrained by the Constitution of the United
States, the law of the State is supreme over the subject of slavery
within its jurisdiction." In what cases the power of the States is so
restrained by the United States Constitution is left an open question,
precisely as the same question as to the restraint on the power of the
Territories was left open in the Nebraska act. Put this and that
together, and we have another nice little niche, which we may, ere
long, see filled with another Supreme Court decision declaring that the
Constitution of the United States does not permit a _State_ to exclude
slavery from its limits. And this may especially be expected if the
doctrine of "care not whether slavery be voted down or voted up" shall
gain upon the public mind sufficiently to give promise that such a
decision can be maintained when made.

Such a decision is all that slavery now lacks of being alike lawful in
all the States. Welcome, or unwelcome, such decision is probably
coming, and will soon be upon us, unless the power of the present
political dynasty shall be met and overthrown. We shall lie down
pleasantly dreaming that the people of Missouri are on the verge of
making their State free, and we shall awake to the reality instead that