whether we really have the constitutional power to do it. I could
investigate it if I had sufficient time to bring myself to a conclusion
upon that subject, but I have not done so, and I say so frankly to you
here and to Judge Douglas. I must say, however, that if I should be of
opinion that Congress does possess the constitutional power to abolish
the slave-trade among the different States, I should still not be in
favor of the exercise of that power unless upon some conservative
principle, as I conceive it, akin to what I have said in relation to
the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

My answer as to whether I desire that slavery should be prohibited in
all the Territories of the United States is full and explicit within
itself, and cannot be made clearer by any comments of mine. So I
suppose in regard to the question whether I am opposed to the
acquisition of any more territory unless slavery is first prohibited
therein, my answer is such that I could add nothing by way of
illustration, or making myself better understood, than the answer which
I have placed in writing.

Now in all this the Judge has me, and he has me on the record. I
suppose he had flattered himself that I was really entertaining one set
of opinions for one place and another set for another place--that I was
afraid to say at one place what I uttered at another. What I am saying
here I suppose I say to a vast audience as strongly tending to
Abolitionism as any audience in the State of Illinois, and I believe I
am saying that which, if it would be offensive to any persons and
render them enemies to myself, would be offensive to persons in this
audience.

I now proceed to propound to the Judge the interrogatories, so far as I