part of Piedmont and the greater part of the Genoese Republic. While
welcoming the latter half of this demand, George III.'s Ministers
protested against the absorption of so great a part of Piedmont as an
act of cruel injustice to the King of Sardinia. Austria was annoyed at
the British remonstrances and was indignant at the designs of the Czar
on Corsica. Accordingly no time could have been better chosen by
Bonaparte for seeking to dissolve the Coalition, as he certainly hoped
to do by these two letters. Only the staunch support of legitimist
claims by England then prevented the Coalition from degenerating into
a scramble for Italian territories.[137] And, if we may trust the
verdict of contemporaries and his own confession at St. Helena,
Bonaparte never expected any other result from these letters than an
increase of his popularity in France. This was enhanced by the British
reply, which declared that His Majesty could not place his reliance on
"general professions of pacific dispositions": France had waged
aggressive war, levied exactions, and overthrown institutions in
neighbouring States; and the British Government could not as yet
discern any abandonment of this system: something more was required
for a durable peace: "The best and most natural pledge of its reality
and permanence would be the restoration of that line of princes which
for so many centuries maintained the French nation in prosperity at
home and in consideration and respect abroad." This answer has been
sharply criticised, and justly so, if its influence on public opinion
be alone considered. But a perusal of the British Foreign Office
Records reveals the reason for the use of these stiffly legitimist
claims. Legitimacy alone promised to stop the endless shiftings of the
political kaleidoscope, whether by France, Austria, or Russia. Our
ambassador at Vienna was requested to inform the Government of Vienna
of the exact wording of the British reply: