knot of vast operations, whereas now it was but an advanced
outpost.[24] If Francis and his advisers were swayed by historical
reminiscences it is strange that they forgot the fate of Melas in
Piedmont. The real parallel had been provided, not by Kray, but by the
general who was cut off at Marengo. Indeed, in its broad outlines, the
campaign of Ulm resembles that of Marengo. Against foes who had thrust
their columns far from their base, Napoleon now, as in 1800,
determined to deal a crushing blow. On the part of the Austrians we
notice the same misplaced confidence, the same lack of timely news,
and the same inability to understand Napoleon's plan until his
dispositions are complete; while his strategy and tactics in 1805
recall to one's mind the masterly simplicity of design, the subtlety
and energy of execution, which led up to his triumph in the plains of
Piedmont.

Meanwhile the allies were dissipating their strength. A Russian corps,
acting from Corfu as a base, and an English expedition from Malta,
were jointly to attack St. Cyr in the south of Italy, raise the
country at his rear and compel him to surrender. This plan was left
helplessly flapping in the air by a convention which Napoleon imposed
on the Neapolitan ambassador. On September 21st Talleyrand induced
that envoy to guarantee the neutrality of the kingdom of Naples, all
belligerents being excluded from its domains. Consequently St. Cyr's
corps evacuated that land and brought a welcome reinforcement to
Masséna on the Mincio. Equally skilful was Napoleon's action as
regards Hanover. On that side also the allies planned a formidable
expedition. From the fortress of Stralsund in Swedish Pomerania, a
force of Russians and Swedes, which Gustavus burned to command, was to
march into Hanover, and, when strengthened by an Anglo-Hanoverian
corps, drive the French from the Low Countries. It is curious to