but they do so under a law that is liable to repeal at the pleasure of
Congress. In both of these cases, the bills underwent public discussion,
and the people that were to be subjected to the law, saw, and understood,
and amended the bills before they became laws. Contrast, I beg of you,
this course of proceeding with the one now proposed to be pursued in
reference to one of the largest branches of our internal trade. Finding
that no bill that could be prepared could stand the ordeal of public
discussion, a treaty has been negotiated, the terms of which seem to be
known to none but the negotiators, and that treaty has been sent to your
House of Congress, there to be discussed in secret session by a number of
gentlemen, most of whom have given little attention to the general
principle involved, while not even a single one can be supposed qualified
to judge of the practical working of the provisions by whose aid the
principle is to be carried out. Once confirmed, the treaty can be changed
only with the consent of England. Here we have secrecy in the making of
laws, and irrevocability of the law when made; whereas, in all other
cases, we have had publicity and revocability. Legislation like that now
proposed would seem to be better suited to the monarchies of Europe, than
to the republic of the United States. The reason why this extraordinary
course has been adopted is, that the people have never required the
passage of such a law, and could not be persuaded to sanction it now, were
it submitted to them.

The French and English copyright treaty has, as I understand, caused great
deterioration in the value of property that had been accumulated in France
under the system that had before existed, and such may prove to be the
case with the one now under consideration. Should it be so, the
deterioration would prove to be fifty times greater in amount than it was
in France. Will it do so? No one knows, because those whose interests are
to be affected by the law are not permitted to read the law that is to be