aware that a false report was being spread of attempts by Unionists to
influence the Army, and in his speech on the vote of censure on the 19th
he said: "I have never suggested that the Army should not be sent to
Ulster. I have never suggested that it should not do its duty when sent
there. I hope and expect it will." At the same time reports were
circulating in Dublin--did they come from Downing Street?--that the
Government were preparing to take strong measures against the Ulster
Unionist Council, and to arrest the leaders. In allusion to these
reports the Dublin Correspondent of _The Times_ telegraphed on the 18th
of March: "Any man or Government that increases the danger by blundering
or hasty action will accept a terrible responsibility."

What passed at the interviews which Sir Arthur Paget had with Ministers
on the 18th and 19th has never been disclosed. But it is clear, from the
events which followed, either that an entirely new plan on a much larger
scale was now inaugurated, or that a development now took place which
Churchill and Seely, and perhaps other Ministers also, had contemplated
from the beginning and had concealed behind the pretended insignificance
of precautions to guard depots. It is noteworthy, at all events, that
the measures contemplated happened to be the stationing of troops in
considerable strength in important strategical positions round Ulster,
simultaneously with the despatch of a powerful fleet to within a few
hours of Belfast.

The orders issued by the War Office, at any rate, indicated something on
a far bigger scale than the original pretext could justify. Paget's fear
of precipitating a crisis was brushed aside, and General Friend, who was
acting for him in Dublin during his absence, was instructed by telegram
to send to the four Ulster towns more than double the number of men that
Paget had deemed would be sufficient to protect the Government stores.