The Fight For The Republic in China by B. L. (Bertram Lenox) Putnam Weale
page 61 of 570 (10%)
page 61 of 570 (10%)
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rights of sovereignty of a friendly Power,--which was his considered
view of the manner in which foreign governments were assisting their nationals to gain control of the Salt Administration The exact language the President used was that the conditions of the loan seemed "to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself," and that a loan thus obtained was "obnoxious" to the principles upon which the American government rests. It is to be hoped that President Wilson's dictum will be universally accepted after the war and that meddling in Chinese affairs will cease. [9] The United States accorded formal recognition to the Republic on the election of the Speakers of the two Houses of Parliament: the other Treaty Powers delayed recognition until Yuan Shih-kai had been elected full President in October. It has been very generally held that the long delay in foreign recognition of the Republic contributed greatly to its internal troubles by making every one doubt the reality of the Nanking transaction. Most important, however, is the historical fact that a group of Powers numbering the two great leaders of democracy in Europe--England and France--did everything they could in Peking to enthrone Yuan Shih-kai as dictator. [10] According to the official lists published subsequent to the coup d'état, 98 Senators and 252 Members of the House of Representatives had their Parliamentary Certificates impounded by the police as a result of the Mandates of the 4th November, and were ordered to leave the Capital. In addition 34 Senators and 54 Members of the Lower House fled from Peking before their Certificates could be seized. Therefore the total number affected by the proscription was 132 Senators and 306 Representatives. As the quorums in the case of both Houses are half the total membership, any further sittings were thus made impossible. |
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