But when once this initial disability has been stated, it must also be
admitted that the course of the military operations has been--apart from
their success or failure--very lucky. The Boers had the advantage of
drawing first blood, and the destruction of the armoured train near
Mafeking was magnified by them, as by the sensational Press in Great
Britain, into a serious disaster. A very bad effect was produced in the
undecided districts--it is perhaps wiser not to specify them at this
moment. But a few days later another armoured train ran out from
Kimberley, and its Maxim guns killed five Boers without any loss to the
troops. The magnifying process was also applied to this incident with
equal though opposite results. Then came the news of the battle of
Glencoe. The first accounts, which were very properly controlled--for we
are at war with the pen as well as the sword--told only of the bravery
of the troops, of the storming of the Boer position, and of the capture
of prisoners. That the troops had suffered the heavier loss, that the
Boers had retired to further positions in rear of the first, drawing
their artillery with them, and that General Yule had retreated by forced
marches to Ladysmith after the victory--for tactical victory it
undoubtedly was--leaked into Cape Colony very gradually; nor was it
until a week later that it was known that the wounded had been left
behind, and that the camp with all stores and baggage, except
ammunition, had fallen into the enemy's hands. Before that happened the
news of Elandslaagte had arrived, and this brilliant action, which
reflects no less credit on Generals French and Hamilton who fought it
than on Sir George White who ordered it, dazzled all eyes, so that the
sequel to Glencoe was unnoticed, or at any rate produced little effect
on public opinion.

The Natal Field Force is now concentrated at Ladysmith, and confronts