persons, possessed remarkably fine, commanding faces. The
officers in general are the most despicable wretches I ever
saw: accustomed, as they have always been, to fight with troops
much inferior to themselves, they thought themselves
invincible. They take the field with an immense number of
artillery, with which they cover their front and flanks, and
thus never dreamed it possible, from their former experience,
for troops to rally after being once beaten. This fatal
security was the cause of the misfortune which befell the
allies on the 19th. After the retreat from Horn, the 4th
brigade took its station on the right, preparatory evidently to
being actively employed; accordingly, on the 2d of October, the
weather not permitting it sooner, the brigade assembled before
daylight at Petten, and formed the advanced guard of a column,
consisting of 10,000 men, which was to proceed along the beach
to Egmont-op-Zee. After every thing had been properly arranged,
it moved forward, supported by 1,000 cavalry, under Lord Paget.
It was intended that the reserve, under Colonel M'Donald,
should cover our flank, and that the column should rapidly
advance to Egmont, in order to turn the flank of the enemy at
Bergen. This was, however, prevented by a strong body of the
enemy, who engaged the reserve the moment it ascended the sand
hills; and although he retreated before the reserve, he
constrained Colonel M'Donald to follow in a different direction
to that intended, thereby leaving our left flank uncovered. But
this did not impede our moving forward, and it was not until we
had proceeded five or six miles that we found the least
opposition. The enemy then appeared in small force, and the
25th was ordered up the sand hills, but, he having increased,
the 79th followed, and it was not long before the 49th was also