advance directly from Fort Monroe under the immediate command of
General Smith, was due partly to Smith's decided opposition to the
overland line of operations, and to his tenacious adherence to the
principal features of the plan which he and Franklin had recommended to
Lincoln. Meade's approval of the direct line of advance, and his
cheerful support of Grant's plans as explained in detail, aided by
Butler's assurances of hearty co-operation, doubtless had much to do
with the retention of those officers in their respective places, and in
the assignment of Smith, much to his disappointment, to a relatively
subordinate position on the line he had so openly preferred. It may
also account in some degree for the failure of those distinguished
generals to work as harmoniously with each other to the common end, as
was necessary to ensure success.

Before following this interesting subject to its conclusion, the part
actually played by General Smith in McClellan's Peninsular Campaign
should be briefly recounted. After the Army of the Potomac had been
transferred to the lower Chesapeake, by water, instead of landing at
Urbana or on the estuary of the Rappahannock, as was at first intended,
out of fear of the Merrimac, which had played such havoc with the
wooden frigates of Goldborough's fleet, in Hampton Roads, it was
disembarked at Fortress Monroe. It necessarily lost some time here
before it could be reunited and begin its march up the Peninsula. It
had hardly got well under way, when much to the disappointment of the
country it found itself stopped for thirty days, by an insignificant
stream and a weak line of entrenchments held by a few guns and a single
division of Confederate Infantry, under the command of General
Magruder.

The so-called "Siege of Yorktown" followed, and General Smith, chafing