This was Smith's last chance at anything like independent action.
During the remainder of this ill-starred campaign he played the part of
a subordinate division commander, in a large army engaged in a
complicated series of movements and battles, and of course had no
control over the general plans or operations. There is no evidence that
he was ever consulted by anyone except his corps commander Franklin who
was himself also a subordinate. The army lacking field experience, did
not work well together as a whole. The corps commanders had been
selected and appointed by the Secretary of War, without reference to
McClellan's wishes or recommendations. Several of them were veterans,
who received their assignments because of seniority rather than for
special aptitudes, and this naturally begot a disposition on the part
of the division commanders, who were generally younger and perhaps more
ambitious men, to look carefully after their own troops and leave
larger affairs to their seniors. At all events, Smith's principal care
henceforth was to handle his own division and look out exclusively for
its requirements, and this he did prudently and well, especially during
the Seven days' battle, and during the change of base from the York to
the James River. His brigades, led as I have pointed out, by very able
men, were more or less constantly and successfully engaged. They took a
most creditable part in the battles of Golding's Farm, Savage Station
and White Oak Swamp.

Throughout the whole of this trying time of incessant marching and
fighting Smith remained watchful and wary, directing his division
through every peril, and finally conducting it, without material loss,
but with increased confidence in itself and in its leader, to the new
base which had been selected for the army. His cool and confident
bearing, and his skillful conduct throughout this campaign, won for him