Nashville, had been broken by the Confederate cavalry and rendered most
uncertain. Its supplies were scanty and growing daily less, while its
artillery horses and draft mules were dying by hundreds, for lack of
forage. The only safe wagon roads to the rear were by a long and
circuitous route through the mountains north of the Tennessee River,
which was besides so rough and muddy that the teams could haul hardly
enough for their own subsistence, much less an adequate supply for the
troops.

All the contemporary accounts go to show that Rosecrans, while
personally brave enough, was himself more or less confused and excited
by the great disaster which had overtaken his army at Chickamauga. He
had been cut off and greatly shaken by the overthrow of his right wing,
and consequently retired with it to Chattanooga. Notwithstanding this
unfortunate withdrawal and his failure to rejoin the organized portion
of his army, which under General George H. Thomas, held on firmly to
its position against every attack, those who knew Rosecrans best still
believed him to be a most loyal and gallant gentleman who was anxious
and willing to do all that could be done to save his army and maintain
its advanced position. But there is no satisfactory evidence that up to
the time he turned over his command to his successor, he had formed any
adequate or comprehensive plan for supplying it or getting it ready to
resume the offensive. Every general in it knew that it needed and must
have supplies, and that the only way to get them, without falling back,
was to open and keep open the direct road or "cracker line" to
Bridgeport. But how and when this was to be done was the great
question.

Much has been written upon this subject; a military commission has had
it under consideration; the records have been consulted; a report has