into effect, with most excellent results, by the relief of both Butler
and Burnside, shortly afterwards, from the command of troops in that
theatre of operations. It has besides long been a question among
military men whether still better results would not have been obtained
if Grant had at the same time relieved Meade, who was certainly a most
competent and loyal general, from the immediate command of the Army of
the Potomac and placed him instead at the head of an army corps.

It may not be out of place here to call attention to the fact that
while no specific limitations were ever put upon the responsibilities
of Meade as an army commander, Grant thenceforth took upon himself a
closer supervision of the details of the campaign, while upon many
occasions during the final operations, he gave his orders directly to
the corps commanders, instead of sending them through the regular
official channels. The result of this practice after it became
confirmed, was in every case beneficial, though it should he observed
that it was far from increasing the cordial relations between Grant and
Meade or between their respective headquarters.

But to return to the breach between Grant and Smith, to the exact state
of facts which led up to it, and to the immediate pressure which
finally brought about Smith's relief from further command in the field.
Much that is as well forgotten, has been written about this unfortunate
episode. Smith felt to the day of his death that he had been
misrepresented to Grant and unjustly injured by his action. He always
contended that the whole truth had not been told, and it must be
confessed that no consecutive and exhaustive analysis of the case has
ever been made. Perhaps none can be made. But from such information as
I have been able to gather, I have always supposed that Grant's action
was based upon Smith's criticisms, exaggerated reports of which were