and the _Dutch_ General in particular declar'd, that he would not obey
even the Commands of the Earl of _Peterborow_, if he should order the
Sacrifice of the Troops under him in so unjustifiable a Manner, without
the Consent of a Council of War.

And yet all those Officers, who refus'd their Consent to the Siege of
_Barcelona_, offer'd to march into the Country, and attempt any other
Place, that was not provided with so strong and numerous a Garrison;
taking it for granted, that no Town in _Catalonia, Barcelona_ excepted,
could make long Resistance; and in case the Troops in that Garrison
should pursue them, they then might have an Opportunity of fighting them
at less Disadvantage in the open Field, than behind the Walls of a Place
of such Strength. And, indeed, should they have issu'd out on any such
Design, a Defeat of those Troops would have put the Province of
_Catalonia_, together with the Kingdoms of _Aragon_ and _Valencia_,
into the Hands of King _Charles_ more effectually than the taking _of
Barcelona_ it self.

Let it be observ'd, _en passant_, that by those Offers of the Land
Officers in a Council of War, it is easy to imagine what would have been
the Success of our Troops, had they march'd directly from _Valencia_ to
_Madrid_. For if after two Months Alarm, it was thought reasonable, as
well as practicable, to march into the open Country rather than attempt
the Siege of _Barcelona_, where Forces equal, if not superior in Number,
were ready to follow us at the Heels; what might not have been expected
from an Invasion by our Troops when and where they could meet with
little Opposition? But leaving the Consideration of what might have
been, I shall now endeavour at least with great Exactness to set down
some of the most remarkable Events from our taking to the Relief of
_Barcelona_.