would pay him just then. He is then perhaps impatient, and asks me when
I will pay him, and I tell him at such a time. This naturally supposes,
that by that time I expect to be supplied, so as to be able to pay; I
have current bills, or promises of money, to be paid me, or I expect the
ordinary takings in my shop or warehouse will supply me to make good my
promise: thus my promise is honest in its foundation, because I have
reason to expect money to come in to make me in a condition to perform
it; but so it falls out, contrary to my expectation, and contrary to the
reason of things, I am disappointed, and cannot do it; I am then,
indeed, a trespasser upon my creditor, whom I ought to have paid, and I
am under affliction enough on that account, and I suffer in my
reputation for it also; but I cannot be said to be a liar, an immoral
man, a man that has no regard to my promise, and the like; for at the
same time I have perhaps used my utmost endeavour to do it, but am
prevented by many several men breaking promise with me, and I am no way
able to help myself.

It is objected to this, that then I should not make my promises
absolute, but conditional. To this I say, that the promises, as is above
observed, are really not absolute, but conditional in the very nature of
them, and are understood so when they are made, or else they that hear
them do not understand them, as all human appointments ought to be
understood; I do confess, it would be better not to make an absolute
promise at all, but to express the condition or reserve with the
promise, and say, 'I will if I can,' or, 'I will if people are just to
me, and perform their promises to me.'

But to this I answer, the importunity of the person who demands the
payment will not permit it--nothing short of a positive promise will
satisfy--they never believe the person intends to perform if he makes