question unhesitatingly in the negative. Most people whose attention has
been directed to such matters must have supposed that we were engaged in
the execution of "reprisals," the nature and legitimacy of which have
long been recognised by international law. They consist, of course, in
the exertion of pressure, short of war; over which they possess the
following advantages: They are strictly limited in scope; they cease,
when their object has been attained, without the formalities of a treaty
of peace; and, no condition of "belligerency" existing between the
Powers immediately concerned, third Powers are not called upon to
undertake the onerous obligations of "neutrality." The objection
sometimes made to reprisals, that they are applicable only to the weaker
Powers, since a strong Power would at once treat them as acts of war, is
indeed the strongest recommendation of this mode of obtaining redress.
To localise hostile pressure as far as possible, and to give to it such
a character as shall restrict its incidence to the peccant State, is
surely in the interest of the general good. That the steps taken are
such as would probably, between States not unequally matched, cause an
outbreak of war cannot render them inequitable in cases where so
incalculable an evil is unlikely to follow upon their employment.

2. The justification of a resort either to reprisals or to war, in any
given case, depends, of course, upon the nature of the acts complained
of, and upon the validity of the excuses put forward either for the acts
themselves, or for failure to give satisfaction for them. The British
claims against Venezuela seem to fall into three classes. It will hardly
be disputed that acts of violence towards British subjects or vessels,
committed under State authority, call for redress. Losses by British
subjects in the course of civil wars would come next, and would need
more careful scrutiny (on this point the debates and votes of the
Institut de Droit International, at its meeting at Neuchâtel in 1900,