to this fact more than to any other was due their speedy victory. The
wages were restored and the strikers reemployed. But six months later
this was followed by a second strike. The road, now in the hands of a
receiver, reduced the force of shopmen at Moberly, Missouri, to the
lowest possible limit, which virtually meant a lockout of the members of
the Knights of Labor in direct violation of the conditions of settlement
of the preceding strike. The General Executive Board of the Knights,
after a futile attempt to have a conference with the receiver, declared
a boycott on Wabash rolling stock. This order, had it been carried out,
would have affected over 20,000 miles of railway and would have equalled
the dimensions of the great railway strike of 1877. But Jay Gould would
not risk a general strike on his lines at this time. According to an
appointment made between him and the executive board of the Knights of
Labor, a conference was held between that board and the managers of the
Missouri Pacific and the Wabash railroads, at which he threw his
influence in favor of making concessions to the men. He assured the
Knights that in all troubles he wanted the men to come directly to him,
that he believed in labor organizations and in the arbitration of all
difficulties and that he "would always endeavor to do what was right."
The Knights demanded the discharge of all new men hired in the Wabash
shops since the beginning of the lockout, the reinstatement of all
discharged men, the leaders being given priority, and an assurance that
no discrimination against the members of the Order would be made in the
future. A settlement was finally made at another conference, and the
receiver of the Wabash road agreed, under pressure by Jay Gould, to
issue an order conceding the demands of the Knights of Labor.

The significance of the second Wabash strike in the history of railway
strikes was that the railway brotherhoods (engineers, firemen, brakemen,
and conductors), in contrast with their conduct during the first Wabash