conditions which gave rise to the idea, it is certain that it was the
power of binding those to whom they owed their selection which enabled
the representatives to resist the encroachments of the monarchy on the
liberties of the people. At first they were not legislators, but merely
sought to uphold the ancient laws. They presented petitions to redress
their grievances; but in time these petitions became demands; and they
refused to grant the King's subsidies till the demands were complied
with. It was, therefore, this first stage of representation which
enabled the people to start that long struggle against the power of the
King and nobles which has ended in complete self-government; nay, more,
it was necessary that they should pass through this first stage before
they could learn to govern themselves. Yet we have seen that if we apply
the modern ideas on representation the start could never have been
made. In what respects, then, did these early representative
institutions differ from the modern conception as a reproduction of the
people on a small scale? One obvious difference at once suggests itself.
The representatives were not average members of the communities; they
were the most influential; they were selected because of their special
fitness for the work to be done; they were leaders of the people, not
followers; they did not take inspiration from the people, but brought it
to them; and having selected these men the people deferred to their
judgment to act for them and protect their interests. Here, then, we
arrive at the first principle involved in representation, which is
leadership.

But there is another and still more important difference between a
representative assembly and a primary assembly of the people. It is
this: that a representative cannot be a violent partisan of a small
section of his constituents; he must be in general favour with all
sections. Therefore a representative assembly is composed of moderate