American people which were not realized, together with the actual doings
of the unsuccessful general. We deem it susceptible of logical proof
that Patterson might and should have prevented Johnston's junction with
Beauregard.

Tents pitched, and the dust of travel from a journey of a thousand miles
washed off, the 'boys' of the 1st Wisconsin regiment stretched their
weary limbs on the fragrant clover of Pennsylvania, and, like American
soldiers everywhere, discussed with earnestness and warmth the causes,
progress, and prospects of the war. Our own position was not a little
interesting. The strength of Patterson's division was not precisely
known, but troops were arriving daily, and it was supposed to consist of
about twenty thousand men. As was well understood, it was intended to
menace Harper's Ferry, a strong natural, military and strategic
position, then held by the rebels. A severe struggle was anticipated if
the Ferry were attacked, and many were the pictures drawn of bloody
scenes and terrible carnage. But the writer, doubting the assumed
strength of the rebels at that point, freely expressed the opinion that
there would be no fight there, but that the rebels would evacuate the
post. And before his regiment left Chambersburg, this prediction was
verified. The rebels, alarmed at the prospect which loomed up before
them of a strong column of Federal troops, burned the Armory and
Arsenal, and fled. And here we may find a key to the whole of the rebel
manoeuvring--they were weak, and unable to cope with Patterson, _and
they knew it_. Upon no other hypothesis can we account for their
evacuating so strong and so important a point as Harper's Ferry.

Up to this time it had been a foregone conclusion with the army, as well
as with the American people, that Patterson was to occupy Harper's
Ferry. No other course of action was for a moment thought of. Even so