There is nothing in all this to change the opinion, previously formed,
that Patterson should have pushed on to Winchester early in July. The
whole of Johnston's manoeuvering seems to have been calculated merely to
deceive Patterson, and to gain time. And so clever was he in his
strategy, that, when his march to Manassas commenced, Patterson,
learning either of the main movement or of a feint towards himself,
aroused his army at midnight, and held them in readiness to fight, in
apprehension of instant attack. As early as the middle of June, when
Patterson threw a brigade over the Potomac at Williamsport, on a
reconnoitering expedition, Johnston heard of the movement, and advanced
a small force to engage and delay the Federals, which fell back as soon
as the latter retired, as has since been learned from escaped prisoners
and deserters. Indeed, the whole of Patterson's campaign shows far
superior generalship on the part of his adversary.

Scarcely had the cautious general occupied from necessity that point
whose strength and natural facilities he had previously despised, when
the term of his appointment as general of the division expired, and the
government allowed him to retire to private life. His successor's first
act was to retire across the Potomac and occupy the Maryland Heights,
opposite to Harper's Ferry, leaving not a foot of rebel soil to be held
by our army as an evidence of the 'something' which had been expected of
the venerable commander of the army of the Shenandoah. He had spent
three months of time, and ten millions of money, and had only emulated
the acts of that Gallic sovereign whose great deeds are immortalized in
the brief couplet,

'The king of France, with twice ten thousand men,
Marched up the hill, and then--marched down again.'