done by well-meant but misguided sympathy, which pushed the Danes on to
ruin and embittered our relations with Prussia for many years.

Not that the conduct of the German Powers was flawless. On January 16,
1864, they sent to Copenhagen a demand for the withdrawal of the
constitution for Schleswig within two days. The Danish Foreign Minister
pointed out that, as the Rigsraad was not in session, this could not
possibly be done within two days. In this last step, then, the German
Powers were undoubtedly the aggressors[1]. The Prussian troops were
ready near the River Eider, and at once invaded Schleswig. The Danes
were soon beaten on the mainland; then a pause occurred, during which a
Conference of the Powers concerned was held at London. It has been
proved by the German historian, von Sybel, that the first serious
suggestion to Prussia that she should take both the Duchies came
secretly from Napoleon III. It was in vain that Lord John Russell
suggested a sensible compromise, namely, the partition of Schleswig
between Denmark and Germany according to the language-frontier inside
the Duchy. To this the belligerents demurred on points of detail, the
Prussian representative asserting that he would not leave a single
German under Danish rule. The war was therefore resumed, and ended in a
complete defeat for the weaker State, which finally surrendered both
Duchies to Austria and Prussia (1864)[2].

[1] Lord Wodehouse (afterwards Earl of Kimberley) was at that time sent
on a special mission to Copenhagen. When his official correspondence is
published, it will probably throw light on many points.

[2] Sybel, _Die Begründung des deutschen Reiches_, vol. iii. pp.
299-344; Débidour, _Hist. diplomatique de l'Europe_, vol. ii. pp.
261-273; Lowe, _Life of Bismarck_, vol. i. chap. vi.; Headlam,