Series), vol. ii. p. 292, for the Czar's hostility to France in 1870.

The neutrality of Russia is always a matter of the utmost moment for the
Central Powers in any war on their western frontiers. Their efforts
against Revolutionary France in 1792-94 failed chiefly because of the
ambiguous attitude of the Czarina Catherine II.; and the collapse of
Frederick William IV.'s policy in 1848-51 was due to the hostility of
his eastern neighbour. In fact, the removal of anxiety about her open
frontier on the east was now worth a quarter of a million of men
to Prussia.

But the Czar's neutrality was in one matter distinctly friendly to his
uncle, King William of Prussia. It is an open secret that unmistakable
hints went from St. Petersburg to Vienna to the effect that, if Austria
drew the sword for Napoleon III. she would have to reckon with an
irruption of the Russians into her open Galician frontier. Probably this
accounts for the conduct of the Hapsburg Power, which otherwise is
inexplicable. A war of revenge against Prussia seemed to be the natural
step to take. True, the Emperor Francis Joseph had small cause to like
Napoleon III. The loss of Lombardy in 1859 still rankled in the breast
of every patriotic Austrian; and the suspicions which that enigmatical
ruler managed to arouse, prevented any definite agreement resulting from
the meeting of the two sovereigns at Salzburg in 1867.

The relations of France and Austria were still in the same uncertain
state before the War of 1870. The foreign policy of Austria was in the
hands of Count Beust, a bitter foe of Prussia; but after the concession
of constitutional rule to Hungary by the compromise (_Ausgleich_) of
1867, the Dual Monarchy urgently needed rest, especially as its army was
undergoing many changes. The Chancellor's action was therefore clogged