ambassador at Paris, displayed genuine fear lest France should rush
blindly into war with Prussia; and he charged Metternich tactfully to
warn the French Government against such a course of action, which would
"be contrary to all that we have agreed upon. . . . Even if we wished, we
could not suddenly equip a respectably large force. . . . Our services are
gained to a certain extent [by France]; but we shall not go further
unless events carry us on; and we do not dream of plunging into war
because it might suit France to do so."

Again, however, the military men seem to have pushed on the
diplomatists. The Archduke Albrecht and Count Vitzthum went to Paris
charged with some promises of support to France in case of war.
Thereafter, Count Beust gave the assurance at Vienna that the Austrians
would be "faithful to our engagements, as they have been recorded in the
letters exchanged last year between the two sovereigns. We consider the
cause of France as ours, and we will contribute to the success of her
arms to the utmost of our power[17]."

[Footnote 17: _Memoirs of Count Beust,_ vol. ii. p. 359. _The Present
Position of European Politics_ p. 366 (1887). By the author of _Greater
Britain._]

In the midst of this maze of cross-purposes this much is clear: that
both Emperors had gone to work behind the backs of their Ministers, and
that the military chiefs of France and Austria brought their States to
the brink of war while their Ministers and diplomatists were unaware of
the nearness of danger.

As we have seen, King Victor Emmanuel II. longed to draw the sword for
Napoleon III., whose help to Italy in 1859-60 he so curiously overrated.