probabilities at defiance.

The battle of Gravelotte, or St. Privat, on the 18th completed the work
so hardily begun by the 3rd German corps on the 16th. The need of
driving back Bazaine's army upon Metz was pressing, and his inaction on
the 17th gave time for nearly all the forces of the First and Second
German Armies to be brought up to the German positions, some nine miles
west of Metz, though one corps was left to the east of that fortress to
hinder any attempt of the French to break out on that side. Bazaine,
however, massed his great army on the west along a ridge stretching
north and south, and presenting, especially in the southern half, steep
slopes to the assailants. It also sloped away to the rear, thus enabling
the defenders (as was the case with Wellington at Waterloo) secretly to
reinforce any part of the line. On the French left wing, too, the slopes
curved inward, thus giving the defenders ample advantage against any
flanking movements on that side. On the north, between Amanvillers and
Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes, the defence had fewer strong points except those
villages, the Jaumont Wood, and the gradual slope of the ground away to
the little River Orne, which formed an open glacis. Bazaine massed his
reserves on the plateau of Plappeville and to the rear of his left wing;
but this cardinal fault in his dispositions--due to his haunting fear of
being cut off from Metz--was long hidden by the woods and slopes in the
rear of his centre. The position here and on the French left was very
strong, and at several parts so far concealed the troops that up to 11
A.M. the advancing Germans were in doubt whether the French would not
seek to break away towards the north-west. That so great an army would
remain merely on the defensive, a course so repugnant to the ardour of
the French nature and the traditions of their army, entered into the
thoughts of few.