miracles are related to have been wrought in the promulgating of a
revelation manifestly wanted, and, if true, of inestimable value, the
improbability which arises from the miraculous nature of the things
related is not greater than the original improbability that such a
revelation should be imparted by God.

I wish it, however, to be correctly understood, in what manner, and to
what extent, this argument is alleged. We do not assume the attributes
of the Deity, or the existence of a future state, in order to prove the
reality of miracles. That reality always must be proved by evidence. We
assert only, that in miracles adduced in support of revelation there is
not any such antecedent improbability as no testimony can surmount. And
for the purpose of maintaining this assertion, we contend, that the
incredibility of miracles related to have been wrought in attestation of
a message from God, conveying intelligence of a future state of rewards
and punishments, and teaching mankind how to prepare themselves for that
state, is not in itself greater than the event, call it either probable
or improbable, of the two following propositions being true: namely,
first, that a future state of existence should be destined by God for
his human creation; and, secondly, that, being so destined, he should
acquaint them with it. It is not necessary for our purpose, that these
propositions be capable of proof, or even that, by arguments drawn from
the light of nature, they can be made out to be probable; it is enough
that we are able to say concerning them, that they are not so violently
improbable, so contradictory to what we already believe of the divine
power and character, that either the propositions themselves, or facts
strictly connected with the propositions (and therefore no further
improbable than they are improbable), ought to be rejected at first
sight, and to be rejected by whatever strength or complication of
evidence they be attested.