contrariety, which Archbishop Tillotson alleged in the quotation with
which Mr. Hume opens his Essay, it is certainly not that experience, nor
that contrariety, which Mr. Hume himself intended to object. And short
of this I know no intelligible signification which can be affixed to the
term "contrary to experience," but one, viz., that of not having
ourselves experienced anything similar to the thing related, or such
things not being generally experienced by others. I say "not generally"
for to state concerning the fact in question, that no such thing was
ever experienced, or that universal experience is against it, is to
assume the subject of the controversy.

Now the improbability which arises from the want (for this properly is a
want, not a contradiction) of experience, is only equal to the
probability there is, that, if the thing were true, we should experience
things similar to it, or that such things would be generally
experienced. Suppose it then to be true that miracles were wrought on
the first promulgation of Christianity, when nothing but miracles could
decide its authority, is it certain that such miracles would be repeated
so often, and in so many places, as to become objects of general
experience? Is it a probability approaching to certainty? Is it a
probability of any great strength or force? Is it such as no evidence
can encounter? And yet this probability is the exact converse, and
therefore the exact measure, of the improbability which arises from the
want of experience, and which Mr. Hume represents as invincible by human
testimony.

It is not like alleging a new law of nature, or a new experiment in
natural philosophy; because, when these are related, it is expected
that, under the same circumstances, the same effect will follow
universally; and in proportion as this expectation is justly