also provide a means for the consideration and adoption of measures
intended for the common welfare of all. Such a League may, probably
must, come into existence, and its aims and methods be formulated,
before Germany and her Allies could be admitted to it; but as soon as
Germany and her Allies can give adequate assurances that they will adopt
and be bound by the principles laid down as the foundation of the
League, they should be admitted to it. Until this is possible the League
must partake of the nature of a defensive alliance rather than of a
world-wide league of peace.

7.--Whether any definite sanction for enforcing the principles on which
the League is founded and the stipulations which it contains can be
imposed or not, the League may be of great value by giving the weight of
international opinion expressly to those principles. Public opinion of
the nations so expressed might often be effective even though not
enforced by a definite sanction.

8.--Of the two definite sanctions proposed, namely, (_a_) the so-called
"economic boycott" and (_b_) the use of the naval and military forces of
the leagued States or of certain States selected from them by
arrangement, the economic boycott which can readily be applied by all
members of the League alike, and that without keeping up any large
armaments, is likely to be effective and is free from the most serious
objections against the other sanction suggested.

9.--So many difficulties would arise in fixing the terms of any
stipulations as to the employment of military and naval forces to carry
into effect the requirements of the League, that to make such provisions
a necessary preliminary condition to the existence of the League from
the outset might indefinitely delay the formation of such a League, and,