likely to incorporate Ireland. The alliance of France is a different
matter. Reflection, however, mitigates the dread of its occurrence.
Active alliance with Ireland would mean war with England, and now for
seventy years France and England have been at peace. This state of
things is the more remarkable because there have during that period
arisen occasions for discord, and because no feeling of sentimental
friendship forbids warfare. The true guarantee for peace between nations
which were long deemed hereditary foes is the immense interest which
each has in abstaining from war. Could the state of things which existed
at the beginning of the century be revived, thousands of Englishmen and
Frenchmen would be ruined. The security for peace depending upon
national interest would not be diminished were Ireland to-morrow
proclaimed an independent republic. That this independence would
facilitate French attack is undeniable, but attack would not be the more
likely to occur. Add to all this that Irish discontent or sedition
would, during a war, help France as much as Irish independence. Ireland
is no doubt the weak point in the defences of Great Britain. This no
one denies. The only question is whether and to what extent the
independence of that country would widen the breach in England's
defensive system.

[Sidenote: Possible advantages of Separation]

Any one who attempts to forecast the probable evils to England of Irish
independence should keep one recollection constantly before his mind.
The wisest thinkers of the eighteenth century (including Burke) held
that the independence of the American Colonies meant the irreparable
ruin of Great Britain. There were apparently solid grounds for this
belief; experience has proved it to be without foundation.