had no means to equip such an expedition, and thus the good will
manifested by the natives was thrown away.

In spite of this neglect, I determined to persevere, relying upon
sacrifices made by the Peruvians themselves in our favour. General
Ramirez was actively engaged in drawing men from distant garrisons to
act against our small force, which was suffering severely from ague.
Nevertheless, every effort was made again to advance into the
interior--a number of recruits from the adjacent provinces having been
enrolled--and everything promised a general revolt in favour of
independence, when the Governor of Arequipa communicated to us
intelligence that an armistice had been agreed upon for twenty days,
between General San Martin and the Viceroy Lacerna. This happening just
at the moment when hostilities could have been carried on with the
greatest effect, and we were preparing to attack Arequipa itself--was
annoying in the extreme; the more so, as the application had come from
the Viceroy, who, being the first to receive intelligence of our
success, had, no doubt, deceived General San Martin into the
arrangement, in order to check our operations in the South.

This armistice was ratified on the 23rd of May, and sent by express to
the Governor of Arequipa, the unusual haste proving the object of the
Viceroy in persuading General San Martin to its ratification. To have
regarded the armistice as a preliminary to the independence of Peru was
a great mistake on the part of General San Martin, as the Viceroy
Lacerna had no more power to acknowledge the absolute independence of
the Colonists, than had his predecessor; and therefore the object of the
armistice could have been none other than to put a stop to our progress,
thereby giving the Spanish generals time to collect their scattered
forces, without any corresponding advantage to the patriot cause.