spirit. He knew that he had a strong body of partisans in Utrecht,
Friesland and elsewhere, for he had posed as the friend of the people's
rights against the nobles and those burgher-aristocracies in the cities
in whose hands all real power rested, and by his attitude in religious
matters he had won for himself the support of the Calvinist preachers.
His agents, Deventer in Utrecht, Aysma in Friesland and Sonoy in the
North-Quarter, were able men, who could count on the help of the
democracy, whom they flattered. So Leicester came back with the
determination to override the opposition of the Estates of Holland and
compel their submission to his will. But he found that he only succeeded
in making that opposition more resolute. His attempts to overthrow the
supremacy of the "regents" in Amsterdam, Leyden, Enkhuizen and other
towns were complete failures. Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice were supreme
in Holland and Zeeland; and the power of the purse gave to Holland a
controlling voice in the States-General. The position of Leicester was
shaken also by his inability to relieve Sluis, which important seaport
fell after a long siege into Parma's hands, August 5. Its capture was
attributed by rumour, which in this case had no foundation, to the
treachery of the English governor and garrison. Moreover it was
discovered that for some months secret peace negotiations had been
passing between the English government and Parma; and this aroused
violent suspicions that the Netherlands were merely being used as pawns
in English policy, and alienated from the governor-general the sympathy
of the preachers, who had been his strongest supporters. Humiliated and
broken in spirit, Leicester, after many bickerings and recriminations,
finally left the Netherlands (December 10), though his formal
resignation of his post did not reach the States-General until the
following April. Lord Willoughby was placed in command of the English
troops.