opposition was encouraged and supported by Philip II, who regarded Henry
IV as a menace and danger to the Spanish power. Parma, therefore, whose
active prosecution of the war against the rebel provinces had been so
long hindered by having to hold his army in readiness for the projected
invasion of England, found himself, after the failure and destruction of
the Armada, in no better position for a campaign in the northern
Netherlands. Disappointment and false charges against him brought on a
serious illness, and on his recovery he received orders to conduct an
expedition into France. William Lewis of Nassau had for sometime been
urging upon the States-General that the time for remaining upon the
strict defensive was past, and that, when the enemy's efforts were
weakened and distracted, the best defence was a vigorous offensive. At
first he spoke to deaf ears, but he found now a powerful supporter in
Maurice, and the two stadholders prevailed. They had now by careful and
assiduous training created a strong and well-disciplined army for the
service of the States. This army was made up by contingents of various
nationalities, English, Scottish, French and German as well as
Netherlanders. But the material was on the whole excellent, and the
entire force was welded together by confidence in their leaders.

In 1590 the capture of Breda by a ruse (seventy men hidden beneath a
covering of peat making their entrance into the town and opening the
gates to their comrades outside) was a good omen for the campaign that
was planned for 1591. For the first time Maurice had an opportunity for
showing his genius for war and especially for siege warfare. By rapid
movements he took first Zutphen, then Deventer and Delfzijl, and
relieved the fort of Knodsenburg (near Nijmwegen). Thus successful on
the eastern frontier, the stadholder hurried to Zeeland and captured
Hulst, the key to the land of Waas. He then turned his steps again to
the east and appearing suddenly before Nijmwegen made himself master of