multiform and. Protean escaped the bonds of logic and definition. In
his sermon "Against Foolish Talking and Jesting" the learned Dr. Isaac
Barrow attempted to describe some of the forms which it took; the
forms were many, and it is difficult to discover any element which
they held in common. Nevertheless Barrow ventured a summary:

It is, in short, a manner of speaking out of the simple and
plain way, (such as Reason teacheth and proveth things by,)
which by a pretty surprizing uncouthness in conceit of
expression doth affect and amuse the fancy, stirring in it
some wonder, and breeding some delight thereto.

And about sixty years later, despite the work of Hobbes and Locke in
calling attention to the importance of semantics, the confusion still
existed. According to John Oldmixon (_Essay on Criticism_, 1727, p.
21), "Wit and Humour, Wit and good Sense, Wit and Wisdom, Wit and
Reason, Wit and Craft; nay, Wit and Philosophy, are with us almost the
same Things." Some such confusion is apparent in the definition
presented by the _Essay on Wit_ (1748, p. 6).

In general it was recognized that there were two main kinds of wit.
Both fancy and judgment, said Hobbes (_Human Nature_, X, sect. 4), are
usually understood in the term _wit_; and wit seems to be "a tenuity
and agility of spirits," opposed to the sluggishness of spirits
assumed to be characteristic of dull people. Sometimes wit was used in
this sense to translate the words _ingenium_ or _l'esprit_. But
Hobbes's disciple Walter Charleton objected to making it the
equivalent of _ingenium_, which, he said, rather signified a man's
natural inclination--that is, genius. Instead, he described wit as
either the faculty of understanding, or an act or effect of that