IV. _A._ My opinion is, that a wise man is subject to grief.

_M._ What, and to the other perturbations of mind, as fears, lusts,
anger? For these are pretty much like what the Greeks call [Greek:
pathê]. I might call them diseases, and that would be a literal
translation, but it is not agreeable to our way of speaking. For envy,
delight, and pleasure are all called by the Greeks diseases, being
affections of the mind not in subordination to reason; but we, I think,
are right in calling the same motions of a disturbed soul
perturbations, and in very seldom using the term diseases; though,
perhaps, it appears otherwise to you.

_A._ I am of your opinion.

_M._ And do you think a wise man subject to these?

_A._ Entirely, I think.

_M._ Then that boasted wisdom is but of small account, if it differs so
little from madness?

_A._ What? does every commotion of the mind seem to you to be madness?

_M._ Not to me only; but I apprehend, though I have often been
surprised at it, that it appeared so to our ancestors many ages before
Socrates; from whom is derived all that philosophy which relates to
life and morals.

_A._ How so?