likewise be subject to anger; for as he is free from anger, he must
likewise be free from grief. Again, could a wise man be subject to
grief, he might also be liable to pity, or even might be open to a
disposition towards envy (_invidentia_); I do not say to envy
(_invidia_), for that can only exist by the very act of envying: but we
may fairly form the word _invidentia_ from _invidendo_, and so avoid
the doubtful name _invidia;_ for this word is probably derived from
_in_ and _video_, looking too closely into another's fortune; as it is
said in the Melanippus,

Who envies me the flower of my children?

where the Latin is _invidit florem._ It may appear not good Latin, but
it is very well put by Accius; for as _video_ governs an accusative
case, so it is more correct to say _invideo florem_ than _flori._ We
are debarred from saying so by common usage. The poet stood in his own
right, and expressed himself with more freedom.

X. Therefore compassion and envy are consistent in the same man; for
whoever is uneasy at any one's adversity is also uneasy at another's
prosperity: as Theophrastus, while he laments the death of his
companion Callisthenes, is at the same time disturbed at the success of
Alexander; and therefore he says that Callisthenes met with man of the
greatest power and good fortune, but one who did not know how to make
use of his good fortune. And as pity is an uneasiness which arises from
the misfortunes of another, so envy is an uneasiness that proceeds from
the good success of another: therefore whoever is capable of pity is
capable of envy. But a wise man is incapable of envy, and consequently
incapable of pity. But were a wise man used to grieve, to pity also
would be familiar to him; therefore to grieve is a feeling which cannot