for could you persuade one in grief that nothing is an evil but what is
base, you would not only cure him of grief, but folly. But the time for
such precepts is not well chosen. Besides, Cleanthes does not seem to
me sufficiently aware that affliction may very often proceed from that
very thing which he himself allows to be the greatest misfortune. For
what shall we say? When Socrates had convinced Alcibiades, as we are
told, that he had no distinctive qualifications as a man different from
other people, and that, in fact, there was no difference between him,
though a man of the highest rank, and a porter; and when Alcibiades
became uneasy at this, and entreated Socrates, with tears in his eyes,
to make him a man of virtue, and to cure him of that mean position;
what shall we say to this, Cleanthes? Was there no evil in what
afflicted Alcibiades thus? What strange things does Lycon say? who,
making light of grief, says that it arises from trifles, from things
that affect our fortune or bodies, not from the evils of the mind.
What, then? did not the grief of Alcibiades proceed from the defects
and evils of the mind? I have already said enough of Epicurus's
consolation.

XXXIII. Nor is that consolation much to be relied on, though it is
frequently practised, and sometimes has some effect, namely, "That you
are not alone in this." It has its effect, as I said, but not always,
nor with every person, for some reject it; but much depends on the
application of it; for you ought rather to show, not how men in general
have been affected with such evils, but how men of sense have borne
them. As to Chrysippus's method, it is certainly founded in truth; but
it is difficult to apply it in time of distress. It is a work of no
small difficulty to persuade a person in affliction that he grieves
merely because he thinks it right so to do. Certainly, then, as in
pleadings we do not state all cases alike (if I may adopt the language